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The origin of this thesis lay in the emergence of a minority group of „religious‟ 
activists in London, England. The purpose of this group was to establish “Shari‟a 
Zones” in pockets of Waltham Forest and Tower Hamlets, wherein certain acts would 
be prohibited and Shari‟a law would be enforced. This led to an examination of the 
theological and religious beliefs of this small and much marginalized section of the 
British Muslim community. What became apparent is that this group prescribed to a 
view of Islam, and shariah law in particular, which is incongruent with the provisions 
of human rights law. In complete contrast, as this thesis will explain, there are other 
interpretations of Shari‟a law that are more complimentary to the tenets of human 
rights and civil liberties on which British society is based. This assertion should 
underscore how the principles of equality and justice are intrinsic to the Islamic 
faith.Having identified the above divergence in the representation of Islam by this 
sub-strata of British Muslims, this thesis will consider the British system within which 
this group and other Muslims operate. This is primarily done to get a general idea 
about how British Muslims are allowed and tolerated, by the system, to be as such. 
The conclusion reached is that these particular Muslims are not just portraying in 
inaccurate image of British Muslims, but they may well be practicing their religion 
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What it is:  
 Come late July 2011, residents of the London boroughs of Waltham Forest, 
Tower Hamlets and Newham started noticing yellow posters around the neighborhood 
announcing the Shari'a law enforcement zones.
1
 The posters read as follows:  
You are now entering a Shari'a Controlled Zone | Islamic Rules 
Enforced: No Alcohol, No Gambling, No Music or Concerts, No Porn 
or Prostitution, No Drugs or Smoking | "Shariah" A Better Society.
2
  
 Members of one British Islamic group had perimetered certain neighborhoods 
in London with posters marking Shari‟a-controlled zones: where certain acts and 
behaviors were declared intolerable by Muslim residents, and punishable by Islamic 
Law.
3
 At the end of the stretch, the project is designed as a building block towards an 
Islamic Caliphate; historically seen as the ideal representation of unity in Islam.
4
 In its 
details, however, it stands at a fascinating contrast with the surrounding society and 
governing system. Furthermore, the project is designed to prove how Shari'a can 




 The main question to be discussed in the course of this paper is the viability of 
the demand to incorporate Shari'a law in the British legal system; from the lens of 
both international human rights law and Shari'a law. Such viability can be determined 
after an understanding of the perceptions of good in confrontation: the British society 
(protected by UK law), the provided interpretation of Shari'a, and its compatibility 
with international human rights law (highlighted in the five indivisible rights). The 
compatibility between Shari'a and human rights is empirical to the evaluation of the 
demand for several reasons. For one, UK law and human rights law have gone hand-
in-hand for decades, seeing as the UK is a forefather of IHRL. Two, Shari'a has been 
subject to numerous interpretations that present radically differing perceptions of the 
good (ultimately, all leading to heaven but via different lifestyles). It is essential to 
                                                 
1
 Stephen Brown, 'Shari'a-Controlled Zones' Sweep UK, FrontPage Mag, July 29, 2011.  
2
 Exhibit A  
3
 Soeren Kern, Europe on Edge: Growth of Islamistan in Europe means No-Go Zones for Non-
Muslims, The Cutting Edge, August 28, 2011. 
4
 MATHIEU GUIDÈRE, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, 67 (Jon Woronoff 
ed., Scarecrow Press 2012) (2012). 
5





understand the perception put forth by the Islamic group, even more so to contrast it 
with another, to get a full grip of the possible outcome of the amalgamation of the 
legal systems or lack thereof. Three, in the off chance of its incompatibility, it is 
equally important to understand how the application of such an interpretation would 
affect the enjoyment (or not) of human rights. As such, the viability of both the 
demand and the interpretation can be determined.  
 This paper will take a brief look at the history of this Islamic group, the 
ideological origins behind their project, and the possible manifestations and/or 
repercussions of its outcome. Part I of this paper will serve to strengthen the notion of 
an interconnection between the rights; as premises for the discussion of consequences 
later on. Part II will serve as a brief introduction of the group: their historical origins 
in UK and the ideological offensive at play within the society for the past decade. The 
following parts will contain an elaboration of two contrasting, and almost equally 
perfectionist, perceptions of the good: the Islamic Caliphate, projected by the non-
secularist group, vis-à-vis the Secular state, promoted by secularist intellectuals and 
furthered by the UK government. The final part of this paper will entertain the 
hypothetical outcomes of this project, and their consequences; specifically in relation 
to the individual enjoyment of one‟s rights as governed by international human rights 
law.  
II. The History 
 Al-Muhajiroun (“The Emigrants”) movement was founded in 1996.
6
 Omar 
Bakri Muahmmad, its Syrian founder, global figurehead and Ameer (“Prince”) until 
2003, is an infamous Muslim cleric, author of many publications such as The Road to 
Jannah [Heaven], and The Duty of Jihad between Mind and Text.
7
 Recruitment for the 
group centered around university campuses, where students presented fertile soil for 
new ideas,
8
 and reportedly because they would be subject to identity crisis over not 
integrating well with British society.
9
 Between the years 2004 and 2006, the group 
suffered intellectual cracks that eventually broke it into two. Muhammed, followed by 
Anjem Choudary
10
, carried on with the UK-based Da‟waa Network (“The Calling”), 
                                                 
6
 Elie Issa, A Profile of Syrian Jihadist Omar Bakri Muhammad, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, December 
21, 2012, at 1, available at www.Jamestown.com/Omarbakrimuhammad 
7
 Sheikh Omar Bakri Muahmmad, IZHARUDEEN, 2012, available at http://www.izharudeen.com/sheikh-
omar-bakri-mohammed1.html 
8
 HOME OFFICE, PREVENT STRATEGY, 13, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/prevent-
strategy-review.pdf [hereinafter Prevent]. 
9
 Id.,18 and 22. Recruits notably targeted social outcasts, usually from conservative backgrounds that 
made it difficult to embrace adventurous college life.  
10




as Al-Ghurabaa (“The Strangers”) whilst other more involved parties took on 
overseas activities as part of the Jihad Network (“The Struggle”), as Savior (a.k.a. 
Savior Sect).
11
 By end of 2006, both groups were proscribed by the Home Office, 
under the 2000 Terrorism Act for “glorifying terrorism.”
12
 Shortly after the July 7 
bombings of 2007, Muhammad fled to Beirut, and was sought as a suspect for the 
attacks; leaving Anjem Choudary to resurrect the platform of the disbanded group.
 13
 
According to several of his interviews, the platforms of Al-Muhajiroun, Al-
Ghurabaa and Islam4UK (the reincarnation) are more or less the same. The group 
aims at the non-violent overthrowing of the UK government, its replacement with an 
Islamic state, from where they intend to continue with the Islamic domination of the 
world.
14
 The members reject “standard liberal democratic ideals such as equality and 
free speech,”
15
 and believe that their disbandment only serves to highlight the irony of 
the illusion of free speech proclaimed by hegemonious states like the UK.
16
 They 
portray the situation in the UK to be “limited, deficient [and] even dangerous,” as a 
direct result of the application of a man-made secular system of government.
17
 For 
them, Islam and Shari‟a law are the solution to all society‟s problems. Hence, the 
yellow posters end with “Shari‟a | For a Better Society.”  
Evidently to Michael Whine‟s commentary on the 2006 ban, which had 





highlighted the need for the consistent, universal and effective application of legal 
means, in order to ultimately put an end to the resurrection of different names.
20
 By 
2010, Islam4UK got proscribed as well, Home Security then Alan Johnson expressed 
concerns of alleged support to terrorism and terrorist attacks.
21
 Surely enough, the 
members resurfaced in the news months later, under the name of Muslims Against 




 Id. Alan Travis & Patrick Wintour, Extremist Muslim Groups to be Banned, The Guargian, February 
16, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/feb/16/terrorism.immigrationpolicy. Ellen 
Parker, Implementation of the UK Terrorism Act 2006 - The Relationship Between Counterterrorism 
Law, Free Speech, and the Muslim Community in the UK versus the US. 21 EMORY L. J. 711, 713 
(2008) 
13
 Muslims Cleric Omar Bakri Muhammad Arrested in Lebanon, BBC, November 14, 2010, available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11579274.  
14
 CATHERINE ZARA RAYMOND, AL MUHAJIROUN AND ISLAM4UK: THE GROUP BEHIND THE BAN, 11-12 
& 32, May 2010, available at 
http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/1276697989CatherineZaraRaymondICSRPaper.pdf 
15
 Id., at 11. 
16
 Id.  
17
 Id., at 17. 
18
 Michael Whine, Will the Ban on Al Muhajiroun Successor Groups Work? (Aug, 2006), available at 
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/224/currentpage/10/Default.aspx     
19
 Michael Whine is the Government and International Affairs Director at the Community Security 










 It was through this platform that the Islamic Prevent strategy and the 
Shari‟a Zones were introduced to the British society, both as strong ideological 
retorting to the government‟s own strategies.
23
 With the erection of the zones, and the 
announcement of an anti-Armistice day protest, current Home Secretary, Theresa 
May, approved the proscription of MAC.
24
 Months later, members of the groups 
resurfaced in the news as United Ummah (“united nation”).
25
  
The Ideological Offensive  
 With the continuing rise in levels of terrorism threats that accompanied the 
new millennium, major states, such as the United Kingdom, actively seek to protect 
its territory, citizens and overseas interests. As part of the new counter-terrorism 
strategy (CONTEST),
26
 the United Kingdom's government launched a particular 
strategy in 2007, the Prevent Strategy,
27
 as a precautionary policy to stop people from 
joining or supporting terrorism.  
 Having categorized the likelihood of a terrorist attack as "Severe",
28
 
CONTEST identified four factors that enable the growth of 'terrorist' groups: conflict 
and instability, aspects of modern technology, pervasive ideology, and 
radicalization.
29
 In response to these identified factors, the UK government 
formulated a quadrupled approach to counter the affect of their spreading. CONTEST 
seeks to Pursue and stop terrorist attacks, Prevent and stop people from "becoming 
terrorist or supporting terrorism", Protect and strengthen its "protection against 
terrorist attacks", and Prepare to mitigate "the impact of a terrorist attack."
30
 Prevent 
promised a more comprehensive approach towards dealing with threats of terrorism: 
including working closely with a wide range of institutions, prisons, schools and even 
                                                 
22
 Dominic Casciani, Muslims Against Crusades Banned by Theresa May, BBC, November 10, 2011, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15678275. 
23
 Anjem Choudary, Islamic Prevent, May 30, 2011, available at http://www.anjem-
choudary.com/Islamic_Prevent. [hereinafter Islamic Prevent]. 
24
 Casciani, Supra note 22.  
25
 London‟s US Embassy Demo: 22 Arrests Made, BBC UK, December 2, 2011, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-16006035. Arrests Made as United Ummah Demonstration 
Turns Violent at U.S. Embassy in London, LIVELEAKS, December 2, 2011, available at 
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=259_1322848814. Robert Spencer, UK: 22 arrested as “United 




 Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom‟s Strategy for Counter Terrorism, HM 
GOVERNMENT, at 5, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-
summary.pdf [hereinafter Contest].  
27
 PREVENT, Supra note 8.  
28
 CONTEST, Supra note 26, at 5.  
29
 Id., at 4 
30




charities to address radicalization.
31
 Prevent further classified drivers of 
radicalization, to offer a more in-depth understanding of the characteristics of 
'radicalized' people, their support pathways and participation forms.
32
  
 Prevent was met with much concern from some United Kingdom Muslims; it 
was seen as a “fishy” project that held more evil than good, especially when it comes 
to the potential intervention into Islamic practice.
33
 This was particularly associated 
with the touch points between Pursue and Prevent, which involved data collection 
from the police with regards to potentially radicalized individuals.
34
 Not so long after, 
the new United Kingdom government did find flaws within the first draft of Prevent, 
thus, a reviewed version was announced in 2011.
 35
 Officials indicated the inherited 
programme confused two government policies: they sought to clarify in the new 
version that there is one policy to promote social integration, and a separate other to 
prevent terrorism and tackle extremist ideology.
36
 In the published review of the 
policy, it was admitted that the "previous Prevent work has sometimes given the 
misleading impression that Muslim communicates as a whole are more 'vulnerable' to 
radicalization than other faith or ethnic groups."
37
 Additionally declared in the review, 




 Second drafts aside, Prevent was perceived as an ideological offensive the 
government was launching against the Muslim populace.
39
 It was often interpreted as 
a sinister situation to force Muslims to “sell out” to Western societies and conform to 
the state‟s preferable understanding or accepted version of Islam.
40
 Consequently, 
                                                 
31
 Jack Barclay, The Extremist Reaction to the UK's Prevent Strategy (Oct 2011), HUDSON INSTITUTE,  
http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-extremist-reaction-to-the-uks-prevent-strategy  
32
 PREVENT, Supra note 8, at 17. Radicalized people are often in search for identity; hence they 
embrace "terrorism" as a value system that appeals against their disadvantaged socially discriminated 
status. Their support pathways are social networks and/or movements that promote group bonding, 
indoctrination, and may include peer pressure. 
33
 Barclay, Supra note 31.  
34
 PREVENT, Supra note 8, at 31. Arun Kundnani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism, 
INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS 28-9 (Oct. 2009), http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf. Vikram 
Dodd, Government Anti-Terrorism Strategy „Spies‟ on Innocent, The Guardian, October 16, 2009, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/anti-terrorism-strategy-spies-innocents 
35




 Id., at 43 
38
 Id., at 32. 
39
 PREVENT, Supra note 8, at 40. SAIED R. AMELI, SYED MOHAMMED MARANDI, SAMEERA AHMED, 
SEYFEDDIN KARA, AND ARZU MERALI, THE BRITISH MEDIA AND MUSLIM REPRESENTATION: THE 
IDEOLOGY OF DEMONISATION (2007), http://www.ihrc.org.uk/file/1903718317.pdf. KRISTIN ARCHICK, 
PAUL BELKIN, CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CARL E. MIZ, MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: PROMOTING 
INTEGRATION AND COUNTERING EXTREMISM (September 7, 2011), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33166.pdf 
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Choudary authored a 28-page pamphlet a few days before the announcement of the 
new and revised Prevent, explaining how it is a state tool to monitor its citizens and 
intervene in their cultural affairs, among other things.
41
 Through the Islamic Prevent 
strategy, the group expressed strong contempt towards the secular state; because it 




Choudary initiated the strategy by consolidating a Muslim's identity solely to 
Islam: "A Muslim cannot have any other identity that that of Al-Islam. He is a 
Muslim first and last."
43
 By restricting the identity, Choudary effectively denounces 
all affiliation to the state. Affiliating with the state also risks abiding by man-made 
law; as opposed to Islamic law, which is also forbidden, as there is no substitute for 
the dictates of God via Islamic verses of Qur'an.
44
 Therefore, notions of "secularism" 
and "democracy" are to be absolutely rejected as untrue and "against the basic tenets 
of Islam."
45
 Understandably then, Muslims are to avoid taking part in the legislative 
authority: which issues man-made laws for the secular non-Muslim society.
46
 
Accordingly, Muslims are not allowed to join the British army or the police forces: 
since they are not affiliated with the state, they should not take part in its security 
forces or defend territory other than the "Muslim Land".
47
 In keeping with the 
booklet, the possibility of fighting Muslims while on the army side of the conflict is 
an act of apostasy.
48
  
One provision continues to prohibit the existence of any bond between two 
other than Islam.
49
 Thus, this perception effectively denounces all social ties with 
non-Muslims as well. This latter premise is further supported later on in provisions 
that prohibit the engagement with non-Muslims and the celebration of their 
secular/religious festivities, all of which are alien to the Islamic community.
50
 
Muslims are to reject interfaith and benefit only the Muslim community.
51
 In the 
event that some Muslims had been integrated with the non-Muslim community that 
they behave in a manner different than instigated by the booklet (namely by Shari'a), 
                                                 
41
 IZHARUDEEN, Supra note 7. ISLAMIC PREVENT, Supra note 23. 
42








 Id., at 26. 
47
 Id., at 16. 
48
 Id., at 8. 
49
 Id., at 10. 
50
 Id., at 24-25. 
51




they are to be rehabilitated into proper conduct, as there is no "freedom for a Muslim 
to behave as they please."
52
  
Towards the end of the pamphlet, Muslims are encouraged to promote these 
provisions set forth by the Islamist group, abide by it themselves and never dare to 
oppose its promulgation or execution.
53
 To an extent, it introduces a shift from right 
to duty of being a Muslim, where it is part of one's Islam to promote the religion and 
the application of Islamic Shari'a law.
54
  
 Evidently, members of MAC called on Muslims to boycott the non-Muslim 
society, to “stick to their own” in the hopes of creating a Muslim Emirate and self-
govern.
55
  Hence, lectures were held, speeches were given after Friday prayers; 
pamphlets were spread around town, all for the purpose of “exposing” the 
government‟s true intention behind Prevent.
56
 In order to consolidate Islamic thought 
and avoid exposure to the westernized model, numerous UK Muslims confined 
themselves to certain neighborhoods, marked the neighborhood perimeter and 
announced the enforcement of Shari‟a law within said boundaries.
57
 Evidently, such 
area became ones where “The Muslim community will not tolerate drugs, alcohol, 
pornography, gambling, usury, free mixing between the sexes; the fruits, if you like, 
of Western civilization,” as Choudhary told the Daily Star.
58
 Since then, there has 
been strong demand for the application of Shari‟a law as the governing law for the 
UK: explained as a necessity to achieve a uniform civil code, as well as a healthy, sin-




                                                 
52
 Id., at 27.  
53
 Id., at 26-28.  
54
 Id., at 29. 
55
 IZHARUDEEN , Supra note 2 
56
 Saqib Bukhari, New Report Exposes British Government's Plan to Change Islam (April 4, 2010), 
Available at http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/analysis/europe/9143-new-report-exposes-british-
governments-plan-to-change-islam. HIZB UT-TAHRIR, THE FUTURE FOR MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN, 
http://www.hizb.org.uk/solutions/report-the-future-for-muslims-in-britain.  
57
 Brown, Supra note 1.  
58
 Dominik Lemanski, Sharia law hits the UK, THE DAILY STAR, (July 2011), available at 
http://www.democracyforum.co.uk/immigration/96781-sharia-law-hits-uk-daily-star-sunday.html  
59






III. The Caliphate Ideal  
 What Dominic Gover described as "Muslim vigilantes battling to rid London 
of "evil" drunks and prostitutes",
60
 should be further understood with their 
'radicalized' ideal in mind. The 'value system' in such an ideal goes beyond the mere 
failure of the police to deal with prostitution and drunkenness, as Gover reported off 
Choudary;
61
 It presents a perception of the good, while profoundly distinct from that 
of the "secular" state, is entrenched in ancient Islamic tradition.  
 In its origins, the project was designed to serve the Prophetic end of an Islamic 
world dominion.
62
 Given the literal interpretation of Anjem Choudhary, and before 
him Omar Bakri Mohammed, the world shall be ruled by Islamic governance.
63
 Thus, 
they self-portray as one tool that would catalyze the process of this prophecy. By 
creating the Shari'a zones, they seek to initiate miniscule governorates adhering to 
rules of Islamic law, that would spread wide enough to join perimeters and create an 
Islamic Caliphate.
64
 These emirates are envisioned to grow into full-fledged states 
that would come to unite the world under Islamic rule.  
 In its execution, the project is explained more in layman terms and a status 
quo requiring them to take on such a considerable stance. It was primarily devised as 
such to protect the rising numbers of Muslims in the UK (a significant 5% of the 
population) from the "satanic values of the British government."
65
 Having to live in a 
society as diverse as the UK, under the auspices of a secular democracy had contained 
much hardship for these particular Muslims. In a diverse society, answering to a 
secular government with no Islamic reference, these Islamists lived in fear of losing 
their identity as devout Muslims. For them, like many others regardless of variations, 
Islam is a lifestyle; it is a rulebook to life and to one's affairs with God, himself, his 
family, and even with strangers.  
 This attitude is a direct application of Sayyid Qutb's research and 
interpretation of Islamic law and Shari'a. Where other Islamic thinkers will be 
                                                 
60
 Dominc Gover, Anjem Choudary: Muslim Vigilantes Battling to Rid London of „Evil‟ Drunks and 




 Anjem Choudary, Eid Khutbah 2012: The Legacy of Islam in Britain (August 19, 2012), available at 
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involved in this discussion, Qutb
66
 (d. 1966) will remain a pillar in the understanding 
of this group's platform, means and end result, simply because of the strong impact 
his philosophy had on their project; which will be emphasized as the discussion 
continues. Islamic thinkers included in this discussion had contributed to the debate 
on Islam and state, and/or had (likewise to Qutb) critiqued contemporary Islamic 
schools of thought.  
 The Islamic Caliphate is the "ideal representation of unity in Islam."
67
 The 
implementation of the Caliphate combines both theology and jurisprudence for the 
foundation of Islamic basis.
68
 Qutb wrote elaborately on al-wahdah al-kubra ("the 
great unity"), what he coined as the ultimate goal for Muslims; to unite in solidarity 
under Islamic law as it effectively deals with law and provisions for worship, from 
which social relations are derived.
69
  
 A Caliph, the ruler, is seen as the supreme political power that governs and 
guides people through all aspects of life in all Islamic territories, as instigated by 
Shari'a -Islamic law.
70
 Islamic thinker Ali Abd al-Raziq
71
 (d. 1966) wrote on the 
existence of government in Islam, highlighting Islam as a religion and state.
72
 In 
response to many critiques, Abd el-Raziq explained:  
What I do believe and what I have suggested in my book is that Islam 
is a legislative religion (din tashri'i), and the Shari'a impacts on all 
spheres of life… if the Muslims agreed that their government should 
be a Caliphate and viewed the Caliphate as the foremost system for 
their common welfare, then the Caliphate is a lawful Islamic 
government (hukumah shar'iyyah) and the people must be loyal to it.
73
 
 Where Abd el-Raziq conditioned the Caliphate to conclude the 'agreement' of 
Muslims, Qutb propagated a more strict interpretation of the Islamic state. In his 
book, Ma'alim Fi al-Tariq (Milestones), Qutb makes a clear distinction between 
                                                 
66
 Sayyid Qutb was one of the most important figures in the development of the Jihadi Salafi ideology. 
Despite his humble origins, Qutb enjoyed both Western and Islamic education. Qutb's writings 
critiqued notions of reconciling Western ideas and Islamic ideals.  
67
 GUIDÈRE, Supra note 4, at C.    
68
 Id.  
69
 SAYYED KHATTAB, THE POWER OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
SAYYID QUTB 9 (Routledge 2006) (2005).  
70
 GUIDÈRE, Supra note 4, at C.    
71
 Ali Abdel Raziq was an Egyptian scholar and a religious judge. His writings were seen as 
controversial for the methodology he applied in debating the role of religion and Islamic history with 
government and politics.  
72
 KHATTAB, Supra note 69, at 2. 
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 The first is derived of the word hukm, coined by Qutb to 
express authority and command; thus hakimiyyah expresses government.
75
 Qutb saw 
the entire universe as issued by God, the Creator, hence it is regulated by his rule, and 
that is 'visible' in the texts and the derived Shari'a.
76
 As Sayed Khattab explained, 
hakimiyyah is the ordinance of a man's life, regardless of any gradual alterations and 
developments in man's life, it cannot change his "nature to another being".
77
 Going 
back to the provisions set forth in the Islamic Prevent, Choudary insisted that a 




 Hakimiyyah for Qutb stands as the crossroads between Islam and Jahiliyya; a 
term he used to describe any form of government that is non-Islamic, such as 
socialism, democracy and capitalism.
79
 It was also used to describe the attitude of 
Muslims who transgress against the rule of Shari'a and the establishment of an Islamic 
state.
80
 In fact, Qutb, along with other Islamic thinkers, promoted the strife against 
those Muslims.
81
 This divisionary attitude is promulgated by Islamic Prevent, which 




 While strongly so, Qutb was far from being the only Islamic thinker with this 
view in mind; Gad el-Haq
83
 (d. 1996) had also propagated the wrongfulness in 
separating the religion and the state.
84
 In his writings, he urged Muslims to follow 
Islamic law, or what Mohamed al-Nawawi
85
 described as Dustur ("constitution"),
86
 
and to detach from the western example; where "English churchmen allowed for their 
own overpowerment."
87
 Al-Nawawi (d. 1278) and Al-Qurtubi
88
 (d. 1230) had agreed 
with the succession of Al-Imamah or Al-Khilafah to prophethood.
89
 Both believed in 
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the natural order of a God-instigated law, to be adhered and furthered, and monitored, 
by one imam or khalifa ("caliph").
90
 Thus the western example portrays the 
decentralization of authority into several elements, as opposed to being consolidated 
in one knowledgeable man, all of which are operating within a framework set by other 
mere "men". In the debate on man-made law and God-instigated provisions, Qutb 
presents a rather discernible argument:  
If it be despicable for one to say, for instance, that the sun is an ancient 
reactionary (raja'i) creature and must be replaced by anew developed 
star! Or to say, man is an ancient reactionary creature and should be 
exchanged for another progressive creature capable to develop the 
earth! If these and others are despicable, it would be more despicable 
to say the same sayings in respect of God's law conveyed in the Qur'an, 
the final message of God to mankind.
91
 
 For Choudary, and the proponents of Islamic Prevent, Muslims should only 
abide by the Shari'a, they are not allowed to adhere to a system operating by man-
made law.
92
 Seeing the strong impact Sayyid Qutb and other Islamic thinkers have on 
the restrictive interpretation of Islamic law by this group of Muslims, the outcome is 
seemingly incongruent with human rights law. Evidently, the provisions of Islamic 
Prevent stand at the other end of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
as provided for by international law. The next chapter will offer other interpretations 
that are more compatible with universal human rights.  
IV. On Congruency  
 This other perception of the good portrays Islam to be in congruency with 
human rights, such that it identifies with many features of democracy and steers away 
from the Islamization of constitutions. The first perception focuses entirely on the 
institution of the Caliphate, where the application of God's laws applies to all features 
of life, individual and political; aided by state tools centralized in the Caliph - seen as 
both a political and spiritual leader. Thus, religion and state are eternally intertwined. 
Contrastingly, this perception softly breaks down such ideology through a different 
interpretation of Shari'a and the objective of divine messages. 
 The discussion in the following paragraphs borrows from certain jurists from 
different times in Islamic history. The works of these jurists reflected significant 
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contribution to certain Islamic theories and shaping Islamic rulings through 
independent reasoning; all which are more harmonious with the understanding and 
application of human rights law.  
 In an interview on BBC radio, Rachid Ghanouchi
93
 explained that "a state is 
more Islamic, the more it has justice in it."
94
 In justifying his residency in the UK for 
20 years evading political prosecution in pre-revolution Tunisia, Ghanouchi 
explained, "I was going to a country ruled by a queen where people are not oppressed 
and where justice prevails."
95
 As the head of the ruling political party, elected in post-
revolution Tunisia, Ghanouchi believes the prevalence of justice to be the essential 
key to the true application of values in the Qur'an, as opposed to the literal reading of 
it as disseminated by other Islamists.
96
  
 The conceptualization of justice as a key value in Islam dates back to Rifa'a 
Al-Tahtawi
97
 (d. 1873), a renowned scholar and reformist during the Abbasid 
Caliphate in Egypt,
98
 who identified the then-illness of the Muslim Umma to be the 
lack of freedom. After a five-year mission to Paris, Tahtawi returned to Egypt with a 
newfound appreciation for equity and justice.
99
  
 The stipulation of the equality of all French citizens before the law "has great 
power in establishing justice, in helping the wronged and satisfying the poor by 
convincing them that they are great as far as legal proceedings are concerned," he 
commented in one manuscript.
100
 In another publication, Tahtawi categorized freedom 
as fivefold: natural, behavioral, religious, civil and political.
101
 Where natural 
freedom originated with mankind (the right to have access to food and drink without 
overstepping that which belongs to others), behavioral freedom defines 
"commendable conduct and noble morals," which reflect individual integrity.
102
 
Religious freedom lies in that of opinion and doctrine, conditioned to adhere to the 
principles of religion, the respect of which leads to civil freedom, as "the rights of a 
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city's residents and communities toward each other."
103
 All these categories must be 




 For Tahtawi, the foundation of these freedoms, through just and sound laws, 
creates a counterbalance between the two rights, that of the state and of the 
individual.
105
 The restriction of people's freedoms, without legitimate reason, is 
considered "a denial of their recognized right of happiness."
106
 On the premise that all 
humans were created with two eyes and two hands, Tahtawi's conclusion attributed 
their freedoms to their equality, and that was associated with justice and 
benevolence.
107
 The absence of this justice and the freedom of each individual, he 
believed, was the illness that took over the Caliphate at the time, "when rulers reigned 
by whim, doing what they pleased, and the people had no way to oppose their rulers 
or defend the rulings of Shari'a."
108
 
 Going back to Sayyid Qutb's distinction between hakimiyya and jahiliyya, the 
objective of the rulings of Shari'a, he perceived, to regulate the universe with all its 
ordinances. However, there is a strong counter movement to this school of thought. 
Al-Shatibi (d.1388) and Ibn Ashur (d. 1973),
109
 for instance, agreed that the highest 
objective of all divine messages is to establish justice and realize peoples' interest, to 
guide reason and promote the values of religion.
110
 Furthering their concept of 
separation between religion and politics, Ghanouchi highlighted a distinction between 
two systems: Mu'amalat ("Dealings") and Ibadat ("Worship").
111
 The latter is 
concerned with creed and values, which represent the more constant features of life,
112
 
where the primary orbit of religion is understood not to be the state apparatus, rather 
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 In this sense, Islamic jurisprudence provides for answers to 
the big theological questions; and includes a guideline as to how acts of worship are 
performed. The former domain revolves around the general interest of the public, i.e. 
maslaha.
114
 According to Ghanouchi, this domain is by no means constant, on the 
contrary, it is ever evolving and adapting to new developments.
115
  
 Given Tahtawi's emphasis on equality of opinions, among other things, and his 
understanding of how Shari'a should be defended against 'whimsical' leaders, it is 
important to understand how the 'people', i.e. the Umma, have a say in matters. Asifa 
Quraishi
116
 explained Shari'a to be God's Law, "The ideal of how people should be in 
the world."
117
 Where she stipulates the inability of the original texts to provide for 
answers to "every single life and legal question," she explained the evolution of fiqh 
("Islamic Jurisprudence") as a set of linguistic canons of construction, consensus and 
reasoning; developed by jurists to attempt to provide for some of the legal matters.
118
 
Evidently, fiqh is not manifest in every aspect of life, and jurists cannot claim the 
absolute correctness of their reasoning as they concede to the possibility of their own 
fallibility.
119
 Thus, fiqh presents guidelines for worship and "commendable conduct" 
among people. 
 Islamic law is derived from two major sources: the divine revelation, Shari'a 
(commandment set forth by divine texts, or wahy), and fiqh (the product of human 
reasoning).
120
 Shari'a provides for general directives, whereas fiqh is the tool through 
which legal answers to unprecedented issues are explored.
121
 Therefore, fiqh stands to 
be a "rational endeavor… a product of speculative reasoning, which does not 
command the same authority as Shari'a."
122
 
 Jurists developed other tools to embrace societal and legal changes; one of 
which is Ijma' ("consensus") of the Muslim Umma. For Wael Hallaq
123
, ijma' is the 
ultimate sanctioning authority which guaranteed the infallibility of positive legal 
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 Jurists found evidence in both Qur'an and Sunna in support of the 
authoritativeness of ijma'.
125
 Many jurists found evidence to support the Prophet's 
seeking of his companions' advice, their shura ("consultation"), provided his 
acknowledgement of the fallibility of his own reasoned opinions.
126
 Hence, ijma', as a 
source of Islamic law, mitigated the interruption of revelation with the Prophet's 
death; allowing for the formation of new solutions to arising problems.
127
  
 Tahtawi and Ghanouchi both believed that neither fiqh nor ijma' can, however, 
guide farmers on progressive technology, or assist with exchange of commodities 
between merchants;
128
 which compromises some of the features of Ghanouchi's 
second domain, Mu'amalat. They can provide for the behavioral guideline and values 
of Islam. As for civilizational matters, Tahtawi had stressed the highest form of 
freedom to be that of agriculture, industry and trade.
129
 For those are the key 
operatives to public benefit and the civilizing factor for great nations.
130
  
 Tahtawi was the first to call for a foreign-inspired political concept to be 
applied in a Muslim state; the multiparty system.
131
 Founded on the equality of all 
citizens, and their right to be represented in the political arena, Tahtawi believed it be 
the remedy to the failing Caliphate system.
132
 Obligating people with religious 
practice, Ghanouchi as leading to the promotion of Munafiqin ("Pretenders"), where 
people seemed to adhere to the Caliph's (usually religious) instructions, regardless of 
their own personal conviction.
133
 The Islamizing of the constitution of a Caliphate 
meant the adoption of one school of thought, which would later reflect that Islam 
before the world,
 
 and "pluralism in this context [the multitude of Islamic thought 
schools] goes to the side, becoming a mere commentary."
134
 Quraishi feared the 
repetition of such a module; for it would once again change the way people regard 
Islam and Islamic law.
135
 
 Ghanouchi followed in Tahtawi's steps and offered the borrowing of one 
method of Mu'amalat from the west, in addition to the multiparty system; the electoral 
                                                 
124




 GHANNOUCHI, Supra note 100. 
127
 Mohammad Fadel, Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence: A Study of the Juridical 
Principle of Qiyas by Ahmad Hasan, 15 J.L. & Relig. 359, 359 (2001). 
128
 GHANNOUCHI, Supra note 94. SOURCEBOOK, Supra note 98, at 38.  
129




 AZZAM TAMIMI, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY FROM TAHTAWI TO GHANNOUCHI (2007), 
http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/24/2/39  
132
 SOURCEBOOK, Supra note 98. 
133
 GHANNOUCHI, Supra note 100. 
134
 QURAISHI, Supra note 117, at 176. 
135






 Justified as the means to highlight the occurrence of ijma' and a successful 
way of representing the peoples' say in political and legislative matters.
137
 An 
electoral system becomes a procedure that allows the multitude of citizens to show 
their consensus. Evidently, the state would be a neutral element, where its scope is 
limited to the public domain.
138
 
 A true and efficient separation of religion and state is heavily based on the 
provision of both institutions to fulfill its purpose. The state is an actor, created out of 
a societal need for order and protection of its individuals; while religion is a divine 
message sent by the Creator to His potential followers to introduce them to the modes 
of worship. This perception of the good is meant to offer an alternative interpretation 
for those who wish to learn the difference between Islam and Islamism. Both 
perceptions were entertained to highlight, two examples of, the radically differing 
interpretations of Shari'a law. The Qutbian model represents a restrictive application 
of Shari'a; where adherents are more conservative in their own lifestyle and less 
merciful to and tolerable of others. Contrastingly, the Ghannouchi-Tahtawi approach 
to understanding Shari'a promotes equality among adherents, thus more tolerance. It 
does not restrain freedom or impose practice upon people. Nonetheless, both models 
are far from being exclusive defaults of 'good' and 'bad' interpretations; Shari'a has 
never ceased as subject of interpretation.  
 In the coming discussion, apostasy will serve as a brief examination of the 
widely differing approaches to legal questions via Shari'a. Furthermore, it will provide 
insight on policies instigated by states that have chosen to centralize their authority in 
the one ruler; more so, it will highlight certain underlying political goals that 
'influence' the Islamic legal approach rulers undertake in dealing with apostasy. More 
often than not, their rulings are not without prejudice. 
V. Invalidating Thoughts 
Al-Ghazali defined apostasy (ridda) as the open declaration of an individual 
refuting their belief in God, and (despite attempts to subdue) persisting in disbelief.
139
 
The offender announces he is a non-believer after having been a Muslim, and in some 
cases, can urge others to follow suit; and as such, he denounces his relationship to the 
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Muslim community. Apostasy is applicable only to Muslims; if non-Muslims convert 
to other faiths, they are said to have „changed religions‟.
140
  
Islam was one of the earliest democracies constituted on earth, given the 
historical inclusion of Ahl el-ra‟i (opinion leaders) through the practice of shoura with 
respective leaders of the Muslim world.
141
 While shoura is slightly different from 
democracy, in that it does not entail the rule of people by the people, it is coined as 
the “freedom to express views, exercised by the opinion leader only insofar as this 
does not affect any of the components of the religious doctrine or the cult.”
142
 
Subsequently, this limitation prevents rising tension between Muslims, in and among 
themselves, or with non-Muslims; namely because Islam prohibits offense to others, 
and moderation in response to offense from others.
143
 As such, the classification of 
offenders was identified.  
On one side, some jurists asserted that Islam did not provide an earthly 
punishment for every violation believers commit.
144
 Of the justifications, is the 
assertion of how people were created as mere witnesses of each other‟s doing in this 
life.
145
 Going back to the original texts and classical Islamic jurisprudence, there 
exists evidence to denote the permission of expression and more importantly, the 




In classical Islamic jurisprudence, apostasy was punishable by death.
147
 
However, upon re-examination of the policy invoked by scholarly lawyers, who 
argued that apostasy was not a hadd (“restrictive ordinance”), a more lenient 
punishment was devised.
148
 More modern schools of thought believed, when a 
Muslim is suspected then proven to have apostatized (i.e. denounced the oneness, or 
even the existence of God), they are declared as such before the public; and in most 
cases, a domestic court announces their „civil death‟.
149
 In other words, they are 
legally and socially announced as non-Muslims, and, therefore, all their relations to 
other Muslims are disconnected. For one, they are separated from their spouses by 
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force of law; and they are prohibited from entering into new marriages, even with a 
non-Muslim.
150
 Furthermore, their blood ties with their children are considered non-
existent, to and from whom they are prohibited from passing or receiving inheritance, 
or to and from any Muslim relative.
151
 Apostates are considered malicious influence 
hence they are excommunicated.
152
  
It is the Shafi‟ite belief that apostasy is derived from the same legal 
positioning of hypocrisy (nifaq).
153
 A hypocrite, contextually, is one who „pretends‟ to 
be Muslim, to have faith in God and believe in all three messengers, as part of refuge 
in the Muslim community and protection from its wrath; such as the wars following 
the prophet‟s death.
 154
 On the basis of their secret disbelief and, hence, secret practice 
of non-Islamic rites, Al-Shafi‟i deduced a definition and punishment for apostates. 
Where an unbeliever is one who had lost faith after being a Muslim, and has publicly 
declared this revelation, an apostate goes further to conclude omission or failure to 
repent (istitaba).
155
 Therefore, it is pillared on the staging of faith where in fact, the 




In sharp contrast, legal scholars, such as Cherif Bassiouni, argue that since 
intention is a significant, private and concealed notion, there is no determining 
whether a non-believer has actually repented or not.
157
 In essence, they should be left 
to their own devices, in the hope that they will find their „path to God‟ once more. 
Moreover, Bassiouni believes that putting a deadline on their istitaba may convince 
them into nifaq just to get away from capital or civil punishment.
158
 A suspect of 
„apostasy‟ should not be penalized for exercising his freedom of religion and belief.
159
 
On this thought, another Islamic school comes into the debate, the Postponers 
(Murji‟a).  
As a low-key jurisprudential school, the Murji‟a were marginalized during the 
Ummayyad dynasty for questioning the rules of God.
160
 They believed in the 
postponement of a Muslim‟s punishment or reward (on their degree of faith) till the 
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 For one, they believed that “it was not possible for human beings 
to pass judgment over the status of another human being‟s faith.”
162
 Secondly, they 




Qutb's great unity and Tahtawi's freedoms come into play when whimsical 
leaders enjoy centralized authority, so much so that Shari'a becomes a political tool to 
dissolve the 'united' community.
164
 One significant evidential issue would be the 
imposition on the right to freedom of expression when it comes to literary works that 
addressed the existence of God or Islam, or offered “too-liberal interpretations of the 
word of God.”
165
 This censorship was justified as: socially, a restriction on liberal 
thinking prevented individual autonomy from climaxing into a loss of faith.
166
 Socio-
politically speaking, censorship was invoked to prevent heresy leading to the 
dissolution of the Muslim  
When Shari‟a failed to provide legitimate grounds for the criminalization and 
the punishment of apostasy, a third solution was to resort to foreign laws and 
incorporate them into domestic legal codes. The adoption of Public Policy is a 
relatively new concept in the legal systems of Muslim countries; Egypt, for one, only 




 This policy incorporates the “legal 
principles that are considered fundamental to a society, and which may not be 
contradicted, altered, or violated by any rules or laws of that same society.”
168
 
Basically, it is the legal tool through which state legislatives identify a crime and 
punishment – a crime that cannot be identified by means of another legal system, 
namely, Shari‟a. This policy goes along with the underlying understanding of Article 
10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights; which subjects freedoms of 
expression (expressed in article 10(1)) to: 
Formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law… in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of 
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Under this policy, and the legitimized and, already, rationalized control over public 
opinion, several Muslim authors were apostatized during the 19th century.
170
 
Therefore, it appears that rulers are more concerned with carefully constructing legal 
webs to trap authors who promulgate intellectual ideas of which they do not approve. 
When Islamic law could be used to make that happen, Islamic law was applied. When 
its provisions could not punitively provide for the crime, public policy became more 
convenient.  
Such differing interpretations offer a better understanding of the potential 
political use of Shari'a and Islamic legal codes to benefit some over others. More so, 
they offer a profound understanding of how radically different interpretations have 
become, and how strict and restrictive these interpretations can be. At the more 
radical end, some Muslims assume authority to execute punishment over others; and 
at the other, Muslims conceding to their humility as equal before God and their 
incapacity to judge others. One model offers justice and equality, whereas the other 
involves judgment and superiority. One involves decision made by one centralized 
figures, often adhering to single school of Islamic thought, that cannot be countered 
by 'the people', and another model more involving and tolerant of the plurality of 
interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence.  
VI. The Amalgamation 
 The Islam propagated by adamant adherents to a restrictive interpretation 
disseminates a conception of Islam that reduces audience to pro-Islam and anti-Islam. 
Such non-accommodation of other varieties in fiqh sends out a clear message that 
Islam is a restrictive concept, unyielding and intolerant to any changes in the 
surrounding society, political era or intellectual movement. The discourse in the 
previous chapter was dedicated to support the separationist notion in Islam; that a 
state is Islamic where certain foundations are safeguarded by the state (justice and 
equality); not in its punitive and restrictive application of Shari'a. The following 
discourse will offer a more expansive understanding of Shari'a to explain the 
necessity of finding common grounds between the different schools of Islamic 
thought. Furthermore, this understanding will serve to find common grounds between 
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Islamic law and international human rights law, and evidently, UK law. This 
particular perspective will become the bar against which the three scenarios will be 
evaluated.  
 Because classical fiqh was based on medieval societal settings, and because it 
only provides legal answer for legal issues, disparities arose between Ulama ("Islamic 
scholars") as they struggled to contextualize society in accordance with Islamic rule, 
or use the scientific jurisprudential rule of Islamic law as reference in dealing with the 
constantly changing surrounding society.
171
 With the arising differences in 
interpretation, and consequential lifestyles that Muslims from different schools led, 
some Ulama feared the loss of the common grounds that united the Muslim Umma 
under Islamic law and Shari'a.
172
 Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), followed by Ibn Al-Shatibi 
(1388), made a profound contribution to Islamic law by terming and specifying its 
main objectives and purpose, Al-Maqasid ("Goals").
173
  
 Maqasid Al-Shari'a (sing. maqsid), simply explained, are the ultimate goals 
and main objectives or purposes of Islamic law.
174
 Historically, the strongest critique 
of philosophers, theologians and jurists' observed arrival at partial and superficial 
knowledge, albeit using jurisprudential tools, was Imam Al-Ghazali
175
; he believed 
the provided answers did not reach the "precinct of the heart and the soul."
176
 Al-
Ghazali perceived the highest form of wisdom and religious knowledge to go beyond 
the confines of this material world and embrace more the ultimate aim of Islam, 
which promises eternity in heaven.
177
 The challenge he posed to intellectuals merely 
served to emphasize his argument against strict legal interpretation and reasoning of 
the original texts. For Al-Ghazali ratiocination applied to mathematically deduced 
rules and regulations failed to provide for the non-legal features of life on Earth, and 
what is to come in the afterlife.
178
  
 Al-Ghazali's academic and legal writings are said to have contributed to the 
"cause of reason", evidently, he left behind a "neatly structured rational system of 
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meta-jurisprudence," where he introduced a new paradigmatic shift in the 
understanding of the objectives of Shari'a.
179
 The part of concern of Al-Ghazali's 
meta-jurisprudence is his identification of five main objectives that are to be protected 
as "absolute priorities": faith, life, intellect, lineage and property.
180
 Al-Ghazali wrote 
passionately on the concern of the maqasid discourse in relation to the "the values and 
realities of concern to the individual and the society."
181
 Years later, some jurists, 
such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi added freedom and human dignity to Al-Ghazali's five.
182
 
These five objectives will serve as the building block for the establishment of 
common grounds between Shari'a and human rights law in later paragraphs.  
 The aforementioned five main objectives were described as the ultimate goals 
that Shari'a seeks to protect and guide followers to achieve.
183
 Al-Ghazali validated 
Jihad (" Sacred Struggle") to protect one's faith.
184
 Jihad simply denotes the 
protective measures Muslims are allowed to take to protect their religion; however, 
the range of interpretation concerning the "protective" measure varies from one school 
to another.
185
 A moderate view of jihad simply promotes the peaceful and non-
aggressive protection of Islam through da'wa; in essence, fulfilling the Muslim's 
mission of justice.
186
 A more fundamental interpretation of jihad entails a strong, solid 
and forceful protection.
187
 Qisas ("Equal Retaliation") was emphasized by Al-Ghazali 
to establish the value of life; irrespective of religion or ethnicity.
188
 Theft, adultery 
and alcohol-consumption are "punishable offences as they pose a threat to the 
immunity of private property, the well-being of a family and the integrity of the 
human intellect, respectively."
189
 Not only so, but Shari'a, as Al-Ghazali wrote, 
promotes work and trade so individuals can earn their living; it provides for detailed 
family laws to protect, strengthen and safeguard the unity of the family.
190
 These 
essential maqasid encompass the all-pervasive and central theme of Shari'a; hence all 
its laws are related to protect these benefits.
191
 
 On his part, Imam Ibn Al-Shatibi believed it was not enough for people to 
learn the hukm ("Injunction") of a legal issue; rather, it was all the more essential for 
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them to understand the hikma ("Wisdom and Purpose") behind it.
192
 Al-Shatibi 
believed it was the profound understanding of hikma was what allowed the Prophet's 
companions to rule remote provinces during the Islamic empire; they met the needs of 
the people because they fully grasped the purpose of Shari'a: equality and justice.
193
 
In his greatest publication, Al-Muwafaqat ("The Agreements"), The Book of Higher 
Objectives, was one volume of it, dedicated to explain the objectives of the law (both 
as briefly attempted by previous scholars, and expressly based on his research), 
presenting them as "a visible and recognizable entity; no longer could they be 
disregarded, forgotten or belittled."
194
 
 For his fear over the dissolution of the Muslim Umma, Al-Shatibi had two 
goals to accomplish. He believed the concept of Maqasid would help keep the Umma 
intact through the establishment of a unified corpus juris of Shari'a, one that would 
integrate the varying visions and goals of the different interpretations by scholars and 
jurists.
195
 In modern terms, this integrated code can be understood as a legal top-down 
approach to embrace the changes in the surrounding society and embrace the 
variations in interpretations, bearing in mind Quraishy's previous assertion regarding 
the fallibility of jurists. Al-Shatibi had another purpose, where he aimed to sensitize 
individual Muslims to the meaning of Shari'a, so that they can become "willing 
carriers of its values'.
196
 He believed that the "higher objectives of the Lawgiver can 
only be fulfilled by correcting the objectives of those answerable to the Law."
197
 This 
presents a more bottom-up approach, where Muslims represent their religion (and way 
of life) with understanding and high awareness of the reasoning behind their actions, 
which would reflect upon their 'interfacing' and their relationship with the law of the 
land.  
 The contributions both imams, among others, have made to the Islamic 
jurisprudential system can be collated in Ahmed Al-Raysuni's words:  
This is an entirely new step for the field of usul al-fiqh and its related 
writings; for while the higher objectives of the law were once no more 
than a specific point which might be mentioned or referred to on this 
or that occasion in the context of usual-related discussions, [Al-
Shatibi] caused them to become a spirit which flows through most 
aspects of this discipline. This same spirit likewise flows with clarity 
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and force through the discipline and world of jurisprudence by virtue 
of the fact that the objectives of the law have now been introduced 
into the realm of fiqh-related independent reasoning, whether for the 
purpose of understanding and interpreting a text and deriving rulings 
therefore, or for the purpose of arriving at a ruling on a situation about 
which no specific text exists.
198
 
 The following part will examine a potential amalgamation between human 
rights law and Islamic jurisprudence. An essential part of this paper is concerned with 
finding an Islamic jurisprudential approach that is compatible with human rights. For 
one, it would answer the question of whether there exists one (or several) 
interpretation(s) of Shari'a that can go hand-in-hand with human rights law, and 
evidently with UK law. Secondly, and of more significant to main question, is 
whether the compatible approach mirrors the ideologies with which the Islamic group 
introduces the Shari'a zones project and their demand to incorporate Shari'a law. 
Consequently, the conclusion arrived at through the latter venture will conclude the 
viability of their demand. In the coming paragraphs, a brief and relevant background 
on human rights follow will precede its amalgamation between one perception of the 
good promulgated by Islamic jurists.  
VII. The Indivisible Rights  
 After the end of the Cold War, several positive measures were taken in 
remedying the ideological barriers drawn out by the global political polarization; all to 
highlight the indivisibility of the two generations of rights. The most vital measure of 
which was the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993, where Article 5 
declared all human rights to be "universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated… [to be treated by communities] in a fair and equal manner, on the same 
footing, and with the same emphasis."
199
 Article 5 also designated states as 
responsible to "promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms,"
200
 
regardless of their political, cultural and economic systems. In 1998, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights adopted several resolutions reaffirming "the 
universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelationship of all human 
rights… promoting and protecting one category of rights should therefore never 
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exempt or excuse states from the promotion and protection of other rights."
201
 The 
conceptual association becomes more emphatic: CPR & ESCR are to be thought of 
as- interchangeably- indivisible, interdependent, interrelated and universal. 
Moreover, human rights are to have prima facie priority over the "interests and 
desires of society and state."
202
  
 From a more on-the-ground consideration, the Peru's Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee (TRC) had pioneered an investigation that went beyond the mere listing of 
the "violations" and into the contextual reasons for their happening. Based on the 
TRC final report, the status quo allowing for the violations included social exclusion, 
racial and class lines, high death/killing rates in the poorest areas, unequal distribution 
of political and symbolic power, corrupt judicial mechanisms and disappearance from 
rural highlands.
203
 It was the conclusion of the TRC that the Peruvian government 
showed "profound lack of appreciation for the less privileged."
204
 An entire chapter 
was dedicated to report on the psychosocial, sociopolitical and socioeconomic harms 
at both personal and community levels.  
 The legal system of international human rights law seeks to protect the 
individual, sustain and develop their equal and inalienable right to a "good life": 
featured by equality, justice, enjoyment of rights and protection against violation or 
coercion.
205
 It is a rational and goal-oriented system that pursues a wide-scale level of 
conformity among citizens and states. Much of the same can be said about Shari'a; it 
too is a rational and goal-oriented system that promotes widespread conformity. And 
both contain restrictions against causal harm. The following paragraphs hold a 
comparison between Shari'a and human rights law. This paper relies on a limited 
number of Islamic jurists and scholars, simply because they were the most influential 
in the development of the following discourse. This does not go to say that they were 
the only ones supporting the strong correlation between both concepts.  
 With particular regard to this chapter and the last, several words comprise the 
main objectives, perhaps the maqasid, of both Shari'a and human rights law: justice, 
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equality, freedom and public interest. The sequential ordering of those words, in and 
of itself, bears significance to the reasoning behind their establishment and protection.  
 The preambles of both ICCPR & ICESCR can be equated with the definition 
of maqasid; they set out the core aim of the conventions, which in itself represents a 
general and ultimate objective. The preambles start with an assertion of justice, 
among other things, as one of the fundamental achievements in the world along with 
freedom and peace.
206
 Justice is the primary requirement of an Islamic state, as 
Ghanouchi and Ibn Ashour had stipulated. It stands as the building block of a society 
where all individuals are on equal footing in terms of their relationship with the law. 
Al-Tahtawi was particularly impressed with the strong emphasis on justice in the 
French constitution of 1814:  
Consider the first article: it has great power in establishing justice, in 
helping the wronged and satisfying the poor by convincing them that 
they are great as far as legal proceedings are concerned… What they 
[the French] hold dear and call liberty is what we [Arabs] call equity 
and justice, for to rule according to liberty means to establish equality 
through judgments and laws, so the ruler cannot wrong anybody, the 
law being the reference and the guide.
207
 
Establishing justice, therefore, in the prescription of both Shari'a and human rights 
law, means the right of all citizens to fair treatment, and to the enjoyment of equal 
rights; in addition to the application of just laws upon wrongdoers without prejudice.  
 This equal setting denotes equal rights, the stipulation of the "inherent dignity 
of all the members of the human family,"
208
 and the equal protection of both; all of 
which is sought and promoted by both conventions and Shari'a. The equality of those 
rights is portrayed in the preambles as the foundation for justice.
209
 It was strongly 
highlighted by Al-Tahtawi's argument of equal setting since creation (two 
eyes/ears/hands for everyone), and the understanding of it was described by Ibn Al-
Shatibi to be essential in meeting people's needs. Thus far, justice and equality in 
Shari'a correlate with civil and political human rights. An equal footing for all in 
voting, for example, reflects a civil freedom in their equality of choice, and political 
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freedom for self-determination as stipulated in ICCPR: the people choose their 
representatives and share aloud their political choice.  
 The realization of people's needs through promoting their equal -and 
inalienable- rights evidently means, adhering to Al-Tahtawi's model, the realization 
and non-restriction of their right to happiness without probable cause. Thus, their 
freedom is not restrained. Although the conventions do not detail the term freedom, 
Al-Tahtawi's fivefold definition presents a perception that is harmonious with human 
rights law. Al-Tahtawi's natural freedom relates to the basic human rights as 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration: food, water & shelter;
210
 it entails the right to 
live. Protecting this natural freedom can very well fall under the maqsid of life: states, 
Muslim states and/or ratifying to the conventions, are obligated to protect the people's 
lives and provide for their survival and safety- through a supportive welfare system 
for example.  
 His idea of behavioral freedom promoting commendable conduct can be 
associated with cultural rights; since both are manifestations of a particular set of 
beliefs that individuals act upon and are intimately related to their sense of identity i.e. 
his intellect. These three features are to be safeguarded by the state pursuant to 
observe and promote both maqasid and/or human rights law. Al-Tahtawi's civil 
freedom relates more so to social rights than civil rights. He explained civil freedom 
as if "the social community formed… joining together to honor each other's rights."
211
 
Provided a state where justice and equality are well-established, and the people's 
freedoms are unrestrained. However, private enterprises exercise their freedom to the 
extent of arbitrary employment and termination. The state has to safeguard the equal 
opportunity of every citizen, and protect their identities against discrimination through 
regulations promoting the mutual respect of each party's rights, culture, social 
background and intellect.  
 Religion, faith, the freedom of doctrine: all understandably refer to one pivotal 
right to be preserved, promoted and protected by the state; under both Shari'a rule and 
human rights law. A just state where citizens enjoy equal rights, they are free to 
choose their religion and faith, they should be protected by the state without 
prejudice, and should have a mutual understanding and respect with those of different 
faiths. In this case, any acts of intolerance taken by the state are most likely to reflect 
upon and affect the existing mutual respect. A state could refuse to recognize a certain 
religion and deprive the people of enjoying their right to faith.  
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 Al-Tahtawi coined the term political freedom to refer to the state tools through 
which people are assured of their legitimate and recognized property; i.e. citizens 
engaging in legitimate transactions concerning their personal property are guaranteed 
its protection by the state. This understanding is different from the contemporary 
understanding of political freedom. For one, it draws upon the nature of the 
relationship between state and citizen then and there; 19
th 
century Arab world - 
political participation took a different form, shura. This consultation mirrored a small-
scale form of political participation where the Prophet sought reasonable advice from 
his companions when revelations did not provide for specific instructions. Therefore, 
shura as a principle, at the time, reflect an appreciation of individuals and their 
intellect and opinion; both of which the contributors held ownership to and expressed 
freely.  
 Noteworthy to highlight the mention of property in both conventions; article 
2(1) for instance:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 




In this and other references throughout the conventions, property is presented as a 
potential basis for discrimination; not as a right, or maqsid, that should be protected 
by the state. Contrastingly, it is distinguished in Shari'a, whether in Al-Tahtawi's 
model
213
, or Al-Ghazali's coining of maqasid, as an entity that states are obligated to 
protect in the pursuit of people's right to happiness, and the state's own fulfillment of 
political freedom. Evidently, property, as a maqsid, becomes the hikma behind 
banning consumption of alcohol (perceived as toxic material causing unreasonable 
behavior) and stealing - i.e. threats to it.  
 Freedom of trade was prioritized as having the greatest public benefit. Al-
Tahtawi saw as an "art of governmental administration… [where] the greatest 
difficulty for the person who appreciates the benefits of these arts is to see these 
spheres restricted."
214
 He believed a successful trade system, one that truly advances 
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civilizations, is based on progressive civil education.
215
 Education thus becomes the 
tool for expanding agricultural, trade and industrial spheres, impressing upon rulers 
the capability and qualifications of the people so they do not consider restraining their 
trade freedom.
216
 This understanding parallels that of economic rights: in the free 
disposition of natural wealth as a right to all people and the equal opportunity for all 
to be employed. The ICESCR, assuredly, contains more specific and contemporary 
guidelines that parallel the economic era.  
 In view of the above correlation, it becomes important to remind of a passing 
remark made earlier about Imam Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's initiative to add human dignity 
and freedom to al-Ghazali's fivefold maqasid of Shari'a.
217
 Al-Tahtawi's model and 
Al-Qaradawi's conclusion serve to support the correlation between the notion of 
freedom prescribed by both Islamic Shari'a, in its modern interpretation, and human 
rights law.  
 Where foundations of equality and justice are prevalent in a state's legal code, 
the people are regarded as equal, and their enjoyment of all rights are safeguarded and 
promoted. When the people are allowed to be free, as per the aforementioned fivefold 
conception, their needs are realized. In Shari'a, the needs of the people, their welfare 
and benefit is coined as maslaha ("benefit").
218
 Al-Ghazali impressed maslaha further 
as God's objective, His own maqsid in revealing Shari'a; precisely in the preservation 
of the fivefold maqasid. The concept of maslaha was developed by Al-Ghazali to 
arising and new cases that the scriptural sources do not address.
219
 From then on, 
maslaha was researched as a notion to bring about legal reform: jurists researched the 
constitution of legally valid masalih and the tools to realize the people's needs and 
benefits.
220
 Jurist Ubayd Allah Sindhi (d.1944), identified with maslaha as tool for 
reform of law which is not eternal, and where maqasid and hikma advance the 
progression of fiqh that is more embracive of people's needs.
221
 In essence, Shari'a and 
human rights agree on the course of realizing people's rights through tools that 
safeguard the public interest.  
 Shari'a and human rights law mirror not just the other's positive perceptions 
for the advancement of people's interest and the achievement of justice, equality and 
freedom. They also align on the restrictions inherent in both philosophies for the very 
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same objectives. Shari'a carriers and human rights law proponents share a call of 
awareness, the former willingly chooses to portray the principles of Shari'a for others 
to see; while the latter spread awareness and knowledge of the laws so people would 
embrace their underlying principles and promote their abidance. In essence, both 
parties willingly embrace the mission of da'wa and inviting people to learn more 
about the philosophy they promulgate. Similarly, this da'wa stops at being a calling; 
for neither philosophy encourage the use of coercion as a means to an end. Human 
rights law warns against coercion as it directly impairs any individual's freedom.
222
 
Rachid Ghanoushi had explained the adherence risk of coercion - the consequence of 
pretenders,
223
 whose personal conviction and intellect are sheathed by a façade of 
pretense that proves to be harmful for individual, society and faith. 
 The apostasy case evidenced Islam's strong emphasis on equality of all parties 
before each other, where no one is designated superior to others in a way to allow 
them to pass judgments on them. Islam provides no validation for inferiority in 
mu'amalat among adherents.
224
 The above has proved justice, equality and freedom in 
Islam to be global concepts that apply to all. This global application of the codes of 
Islamic law was the main derive behind Ibn Al-Shatibi's initiative to establish a 
unified code; so that it does not become arbitrary or stray away from the core 
objective and hikma behind it.
225
 In the same way, these concepts represent the 
foundation of universal human rights law that discriminate against no one culture, 
religion, sex, language, ethnicity, color, race or gender.  
 An examination of the correlation between Shari'a and human rights law is a 
pivotal stop towards the advancement of rights and the founding of justice, equality 
and freedom, and the realization of people's needs. A steer away from radical 
interpretations of Shari'a serves to understand the true and original maqasid and 
objectives Islam has to offer and its adherents should seek to achieve.  
 The next chapter will thoroughly examine the British system within which 
Muslims operate in order to contextualize the application of human rights in the state 
where certain Muslims call for the application of Shari'a in its most restrictive 
interpretation. An understanding of the extent to which UK law allows for the 
realization of their rights and needs as a religious minority will serve the evaluation of 
the scenarios to follow.     
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VIII. The UK System 
 To arrive at a fair (but somewhat personal) justification, or lack thereof, on the 
incorporation of Shari'a law into British law, it is necessary to take a passing look at 
the context: the legal and political systems and, evidently, the society. This enables us 
to have somewhat of an appreciation of the status of Muslims in the UK and the 
degree to which their co-existence is tolerated. Of course, this cannot be done without 
consideration of other religious minorities, or groups, within the same society. In 
terms of the bigger picture, this will help to determine the level of their achievement 
of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.  
 Throughout its history, the English system went through several stages of 
development: among which are; the separation between the Church and the Prince's 








, followed by 
numerous Acts that reflect the ratification of international treaties and human rights 
law, especially in the past century. Family matters went from the jurisdiction of 
Ecclesiastical courts to becoming civil law.
228
 With the surge in religious groups and 
minorities, religious courts became authorized to focus on family affairs of marriages 
and divorces.  
 The past century has witnessed the most changes in the toleration phase of 
religious groups. One brief example would be the introduction of the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act of 2006. In 1998, the London borough of Merton sought 
prosecution of a British National Party (BNP) member for anti-Muslim incitement, for 
campaigning against what he called "the Muslim problem". However, the prosecution 
request was "rejected on the grounds that Muslims were not covered by the Public 
Order Act."
229
 For several years, UK Muslims launched legislation campaigns for 
religious incitement.
230
 In mainstream media debates, this was considered a move to 
curb others' freedom of speech. However, the Muslims' side was significantly tipped 
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when other minorities, such as Sikhs, were mocked for passing as Arab-looking; in 
terms of appearance. Consequently, incitement to religious hatred was added as a 
criminal offence via the Racial and Religious Act of 2006.
231
  
A. Legal System 
 In its present status, English law encompasses several overlapping laws that 
recognize and regulate religious groups and individuals; where the laws of the Church 
of England, originally the most ancient and prevalent, are part of the general legal 
system, i.e. the law of the land.
232
 The following overview will help to determine 
whether the legal framework of the UK provides for equality of all members of the 
community and the prevalence of justice among them.  
 In recognition, all religious groups are allowed to practice their religion the 
same as the Church of England.
233
 With the understanding that certain religions (such 
as Judaism & Islam) hold more significant guidelines on the conducting of family 
affairs, such as marriage and divorce, the state has created a contractual bond to give 
religious groups some legal standing to enforce "discipline[s] within their body which 
will be binding on those who, expressly or by implicating, have assented to them."
234
 
This has come to be known as the doctrine of Consensual Compact.
235
 With this 
understanding, the rights granted by the Arbitration Act of 1996
236
 are applied to 
create religious courts; where Parties to a dispute should be "free to agree how their 
disputes are resolved."
237
 This act allows the parties to "make their own arrangements 
by agreement but provide rules which apply in the absence of such agreement… 
[where] it is immaterial whether or not the law applicable to the parties' agreement is 
the law of England and Wales."
238
 As a result of this act, religious groups, such as 
Orthodox Jews and Muslims, established religious courts to oversee and perform 
marriages, and rule on the validity of divorces.  
 The decisions of these courts are recognized and enforced by English 
courts;
239
 they are not subject to judicial review such as is the case for decisions by 
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the Church of England.
240
 The religious laws applied by these courts are "free to 
operate where the law is silent."
241
 Judges of the English courts have demonstrated 
several times their status towards decisions of the religious courts. Eady J held that 
"such disputes as arise between the followers of any given religious faith are often 
likely to involve doctrines or beliefs which do not readily lend themselves to the sort 
of resolution which is the normal function of a judicial tribunal."
242
 Lord Hope 
pressed how "it has been long understood that it is not the business of the courts to 
intervene in matters of religion,"
243
 Munby J interpreted the recognition of religious 
courts to mean that "the starting point of the law is an essentially agnostic view of 
religious beliefs and a tolerant indulgence to religious and cultural diversity."
244
 
Simon Brown J was presented with a case where the claimant requested the court to 
perform a judicial review of a Chief Rabbi's decision, Brown refused the matter on the 
basis that "there was no governmental interest in the decision-making power in 
question… the Chief Rabbi's functions are essentially to initiate spiritual and religious 
functions which the government could not and would not seek to discharge in his 
place were he to abdicate his regulatory responsibility."
245
   
 In regulation, certain mechanisms have been instigated by the state so that 
such courts and institutions register to acquire a legal status. The simple regulations 
are prescribed in acts that determine the courts be registered as a place of worship.
246
 
The registered places are to be dedicated to certain functions, namely the 
solemnization of marriages
247
 and issuance of religious divorce. They could also be 
registered as a Charity
248
 for the purpose of the advancement of religion.  
 The more complex regulations are dual purpose; the first being the restriction 
of the courts' role to religious divorce. Seeing as both marriages and divorces must be 
registered at state civil institutions- alongside the religious rituals, divorce diverges to 
more legal consequences that are primarily dealt with by civil courts; such as child 
custody.
249
 Thus, religious courts, depending on their ritual, coordinate their divorce 
procedural along with the state's regulation: for Muslims, Shari'a courts require 
documentation of civil divorce to show for the parties' intention and certainty to seek 
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divorce in order to grant it; with Jews, the procedure set by the Beth Din courts goes 
the other way around.
250
  
 While civil courts are not authorized to perform judicial reviews to decisions 
by religious courts, the courts cannot enforce any decisions where there is "public 
policy which requires the court not to."
251
 Like any contract, agreements to arbitrate 
necessarily have to show a genuine agreement to arbitrate by the parties.
252
 Therefore, 
agreements obtained under duress or contracted with minors cannot be enforced under 
the British civil law.
253
 In some cultures, men will seek to marry young girls under the 
British legal age for marriage. Such marriage contracts are nullified by the state for 
the incapacity of the girl to be a party in the agreement.
254
 This can be seen as both a 
regulatory precaution and a limitation of the scope of the religious courts. Either way, 
these restrictions seem rightfully based on principles international human rights law.  
 The handling of divorces by civil courts is also an extension of the necessity of 
accordance with public policy. When acquiring a divorce, there are more 
considerations than just the ending of a relationship between two parties of a 
marriage. Ancillary matters relating to dowries, and more importantly, child custody 
are on the line. Despite the fact that certain religions provide guidelines on how to 
resolve such dilemmas, English courts are still the designated authority responsible to 
dissolve marriage and all existing legal ties in accordance with British law. Judge 
McFarlane was faced with one case where Muslim divorcing parents needed to settle 
custody of their child.
255
 Despite the consideration for religious laws, and that of 
expert statements, the Judge ruled to grant custody of the child to the parent who has 
provided the primary care for the son: in that case, the mother.
256
   
 In the English legal system, any dispute outside performance of marriage and 
divorce is one between the Crown and the Defendant, not between the parties. 
Disputes of domestic disturbance, or commercial nature that involve sanctions on 
either parties, even if ruled over by a religious court, will be invalidated by civil 
courts.
257
 One example is a case of two Iranian Jewish merchants who export Persian 
carpets.
258
 Where this case involved a breach of Iranian law, the Court of Appeal 
recognized the arbitration award but refused to enforce the contract on the grounds of 
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 One party was in breach of a commercial contract, thus sanctions were 
to be pursued for his actions, thus the Beth Din court was recognized to have 
jurisdiction, but its decision remained invalid.
260
 Any court that attempts to enforce 
any physical punishment stands to be legally liable under English law.
261
  
 Neither Muslim nor Jewish communities have a preset hierarchy of tribunals 
within their court system.
262
 As such, there is no appeal process. However, and with 
specificity to Shari'a courts, the autonomous status each separate court enjoys, like 
many other institutions of arbitral nature, can sometimes be seen as giving much 
leeway for forum shopping.
263
 Parties can seek the opinion of a second Shari'a court if 
they disagree with the decision of the first one they sought.  Moreover, the notion that 
Shari'a courts do not, separately, apply a specific school of thought (theoretically of 
the four main ones), can sometimes be seen as a shortcoming of the courts.
264
 
However, all these of critiques can be generally applied to any arbitral institution as it 
does not possess the rigidity of legal courts, and tribunals are subject to apply the case 
law of the parties' choice.
265
  
 While some look at the Christian origins of the UK and maneuver that fact to 
reflect upon the intolerance of the state and its citizens, the aforementioned 
description, however brief, of the English legal system provides for the contrary. 
Furthermore, as political theory explains, the law of the land is a reflection of its 
society, and the society is but a reflection of its legal system. Parliamentary acts tend 
to produce legislation, which reflects the attitudes and wishes of the electing 
majority.
266
 And, although the UK is originally Christian, that does not mean that 
toleration is a concept that is alien to it. As Locke explained in his defense of the 
independence of the Church of England, "the business of true religion is quite another 
thing. It is not instituted in order to the erecting of an external pomp, nor to the 
obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to 




 Id.  
261










 LORD PHILLIPS, EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW 3 (Jul. 13, 2008) 
http://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/uploadedImage/pdf/LMC%20Lord%20Chief%20Justice%20book
let.pdf . In later pages, we will discuss the "majority" wishes; Also, a far off example would be the 
segregation, and desegregation, phases of American history. When it was state policy to promote 
segregation, legal enforcements were inductive to social segregation of African Americans from the 
other races. Evidently, it was witnessed in housing, education, employment, transportation, and so on. 
One cumulative civil rights movement after another eventually turned public opinion against 
segregation and in time the state adapted, and came to assert desegregation through another set of legal 




the regulating of men's lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety."
267
 Based on 
which, he continued in later pages to explain how Christianity promotes toleration, 
"As for other practical opinions, though not absolutely free of all error, if they do not 
tend to establish a domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church… there can 
be no reason why they should not be tolerated."
268
  
 Lord Phillip's words seem most convenient to put the legal discussion in a 
nutshell, "British law has, comparatively recently, reached a stage of development in 
which a high premium is placed not merely on liberty, but on equality of all who live 
in this country. That law is secular. It does not attempt to enforce the standards of 
behavior that the Christian religion or any other religion expects. It is perhaps founded 
on one ethical principle that the Christian religion shares with most, if not all, other 
religions and that is that one should love one's neighbour. And so the law sets out to 
prevent behavior that harms others… A sin is not necessarily a crime."
269
 
 Even though Christian at heart and in origin, the legal system does not appear 
to discriminate against religious minorities or promote intolerance towards them. 
Quite the contrary, legislators have attempted to meet the needs of existing religious 
minorities because they are different; so that each group can better apply and abide by 
their religious rules and regulations; such as Orthodox Jews and Muslims, in 
matrimonial matters. 
B. Civil-Political System & the Society 
 On the socio-political domain, which will pave the way for the civil, economic 
and cultural domains, it is important to keep in mind that law is a reflection of society, 
and that it is the framework through which the state induces changes in the society. 
On one angle, John Locke asserted that a government's legitimacy relies on the 
people's consensual agreement on its protection of their -basics- life, property and 
liberty.
270
 On the second angle, deep-rooted in British law are the provisions of 
International Human Rights Law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
to begin with, where article 3 asserts everyone's right to life, liberty and security. On 
the third angle, Al-Ghazali interpreted Maqasid Al-Shari'a, the purpose and 
philosophy behind Islamic law, to be life, faith, intellect, lineage & property. In more 
modern studies, Youssef Al-Qaradwi, the Egyptian Islamic theologian, added freedom 
and human dignity.
271
 In the space between this triangular operation of law and 
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philosophy, lie the Islamist groups of the United Kingdom seeking to execute the 
Shari'a project.   
 Each system provides support for the freedom of faith and religion. Each 
system seeks for the protection of intellect and belief. Consequentially, each system 
values the individual for what they are and what they believe in, and their right to 
their life, as a right of birth.
272
 It does not become so far-out-of-reach to perceive all 
individuals as equal; in terms of their right to lead a life, follow their own belief 
system and receive protection from the state. Furthermore, it does not stand so 
erroneous as to perceive the systems themselves as equally influential on the 
individuals that adhere to them.  
 The incident against religious incitement mentioned before, signifies a certain 
level of intolerance that Muslims, and possibly other minorities, faced at a certain 
point in time as citizens (or immigrants) in the UK. One of the reasons why Muslims 
focused on rallies and movements was because they were not represented through 
mainstream media.
273
 This case was fairly recent, it took place in 1998, and the 
Religious Hatred Act was adjusted in 2006, it took effect in January 2007.
274
 One has 
to wonder why it took so long, and it consumed as much time as it took citizens to 
accept foreigners. For years, immigration was presented more as a concern than a 
plus. Ben Page
275
 placed the UK on a multicultural spectrum between France and the 
USA: France having ignored cultural differences, and the USA having been built on 
the idea of immigration.
276
 Perceivably, the UK is working its way away from France 
and closer to the USA; seeing as how US citizens are more comfortable with their 
differences.
277
 On its way to embracing cultural differences, the citizens were 'taken 
aback' by the high numbers of foreigners entering the country,
278
 and the media hub 
and its coverage of asylum migration waves in 2004.
279
 Between the years of 1999 to 
2007, surveys showed increasing percentages of citizens concerns towards 
immigration.
280
 Contrastingly, the same surveys indicated the citizens' perception of 
the benefits of immigration and multiculturalism: opening up Britain to new 
cultures.
281
 Despite the London bombings of 2005, surveys showed consistency with 
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regards to concerns and benefits. However, a new comment was provided, that 
foreign-born must earn their citizenship.
282
 The concept of earning citizenship will be 
further dwelled upon during the evaluation of the demand to incorporate Shari'a law 
since it will serve then to look at the members of society promulgating this demand.  
 Another important parliamentary act worth mentioning is the Equality Act of 
2010,
283
 which requires "public bodies and others carrying out public functions to 
consider in their day-to-day work the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, 
advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations."
284
 This sets the legal, thus 
the political and civil, footing for equality of all citizens before the law, and 
consequently, before state institutions and acting bodies.
285
  
C. Economic Equalization  
 The elevation in legal status, served to induce an equal, yet slower elevation in 
the economic and social status. On one side, Islamic banking has been taking strong 
leaps of growth in the past five years.
286
 The main feature of Islamic finance is the 
non-existence of profit, which is an unacceptable concept in most readings of Shari'a. 
In order to better accommodate and facilitate the lives of Muslims, the government 
provided for the establishment of Islamic banks.
287
  
 Moreover, the UK, being a "leading international financial centre"
288
, saw a 
spur in popularity of the Islamic banking system and came to appreciate its principles 
of fairness, social justice, individual economic well-being, collective profit-sharing 
and loss-bearing, and economic prosperity.
289
 The Islamic financial system meshed 
well with the London market's flexibility to embrace and adapt.
290
 As a result of 
English enterprises branching out in the Middle East, using the Islamic Window 
concept to promote its banking services, served to resonate in the English streets.
291
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From 2001 to 2007, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
292
 had worked to 
authorize Islamic financial institutions (three banks) and helped simplify the 
differences between the many banking systems in the UK.
293
 By 2005 and 2006, the 
Finance Act was introduced, and it placed the Islamic banking on the same tax footing 
of other, more global, banking systems.
294
 The government's framework for taxes and 
legislation has been paving the way for the introduction of new Islamic products such 
as insurance, bonds and mortgages.
295
  
D. Socially Speaking 
 Among the cultural differences that Islam introduced to the UK, are 
polygamous marriages. English law stands firmly and persistently against bigamy and 
polygamy, Section 11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 definitively voids 
marriage of such nature.
296
 Nonetheless, to embrace the social and cultural trends 
associated with Muslims, the state recognized polygamous marriages, if and when 
performed outside of the UK, in a state that allows for the occurrence of polygamous 
marriages, and where the wife applying for immigration seeks it in a capacity other 
than her being a spouse.
297
 It is worth mentioning that, up to 2007, the state has 
recognized over a 1000 polygamous marriage.
298
 
 Once spouses have become citizens of the state, and provided certain 
regulations concerning payments of insurance, they can apply to receive state 
pensions. As Chris Grayling explained,  
For income-replacement benefits such as income support, income-
based jobseeker's allowance and income-related employment and 
support allowance, the husband and the first wife claim as a couple. 
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 It is also worth mentioning that, unlike other European countries, Muslim girls 




E. Cultural Aspect 
 Appreciation of religious groups can be seen on the cultural level. A simple 
yet powerful example would be the slaughtering of animals. In 1995, the Welfare of 
Animals Regulations
301
 were introduced in embracement of religious groups, namely 
Jews and Muslims, whose religions require certain procedure for the killing of 
animals for the purpose of feeding.
302
 This would explain the Halal signs displayed by 
certain shops in the streets of London, signifying that all meats served were 
slaughtered in the merciful manner required by both religions.  
 In the month of Ramadan
303
, MP Jon Ashworth decided to fast for one day in 
order to have a deeper appreciation for the fasting he witnessed over 3000 Muslim 
athletes observe well during the Olympics of 2012.
304
 At the end of his experience he 
had this to say about it: "Islam is a religion, sadly often much misunderstood in the 
west and although my own experience was just for one day, I saw a religion which 
took pride in extending kindness, peace and understanding to those within the religion 
and those from outside."
305
  
 On a bigger scale, in 2011, the parliament enacted the Localism Act
306
, which 
now provides legal powers for all major local authorities to consider prayers as part of 





 All of the previous examples reflect the economic socio-cultural appreciations 
that the former Archbishop of Canterbury, followed by Lord Phillips, had attempted 
to understand and raise awareness on through two profound lectures promoting the 
understanding of Shari'a. In the turns of multiculturalism, Dr. Rowan Williams had 
attempted to dispel a few myths about Shari'a. He expressed concerns for Muslims 
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within the society who might face difficulty with social integration.
308
 After thorough 
study of the religious system, Williams concluded that individuals can lead a life as 
abiding believers of the Shari'a without being in conflict with their rights, as 
guaranteed by English laws.
309
  
 Given the wider context of the British system, it appears that Sir John 
Donaldson words are highly accurate, that "the starting point of our domestic law is 
that every citizens has a right to do what he likes, unless restrained by the common 
law or by statute."
310
 The law has gone through many changes along the years and it 
arrived to a successful point where "Muslim men and Muslim women are entitled to 
be treated in exactly the same way as all other men and women in the country."
311
 The 
law did develop and reformulate to focus not just on liberty, but also, on equality. 
While it seeks to prevent anti-social behavior, and actions that cause harm onto 
others, it regards all its citizens as equal.  
 Going back to Dr. Williams conclusion on Muslim citizens leading 
harmonious lives, and bearing in the back of our minds that the religion of this paper 
is international human rights, not Shari'a or British law, it seems clear that the legal 
pretext strongly provides for the achievement and satisfaction of Muslims' civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights as UK citizens.  
IX. The Demand 
 Before evaluating the validity of the Demand, an understanding of the why 
behind it is in order. The discussion will then move towards the hypothesizing of 
possible three different scenarios in response to the demand of incorporating Shari'a 
law into British law. Notwithstanding, this is not a critique of the religion; it is a 
critique of the Demand and the possible advancements and/or consequences of each 
scenario in light of the amalgamation between human rights law and Shari'a.
312
 The 
status quo discussion entertained in the previous chapter was aimed at providing a 
grand picture of the society, to inform of how religious minorities are regarded in the 
eyes of the law, and how much freedom of religion and practice does the UK 
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government safeguard as a forefather/founding state of international human rights 
law. Based on which, the scenarios will be evaluated.   
 On the left side of the spectrum, Islam is interpreted as the operative 
framework for a patriarchal system, explained as the default and natural division of 
social roles assigned by God.
313
 Perceived as a superior religion, in every aspect of 
life, leftists believe it cannot be surpassed by any other religion or ideology.
314
 Thus 
the implementation of Shari'a, both civil and criminal codes, is not just the core of this 
school, it is the default. The evaluation of the principles and provisions called for is 
based on their portrayal in the Islamic Prevent booklet distributed starting May 2011, 
in protest of the previously discussed Prevent Strategy launched by the UK 
government. 
 This Demand was first brought about in 2009, when a group of Islamists 
introduced the Shari'a Zones project.
315
 This group is not representative of the entire 
UK Muslim community;
316
 however, they have declared it is their duty to awaken 
Muslims from the slumber and false peace brought about by western ideology.
317
  
 According to one leader behind this Demand, there are four ways to achieve 
implementation of Islamic law: either via a collective Muslim rise in favor of it; or a 
strong Muslim lobby on foreign policy towards its implementation; collective 
choosing of a Shari'a-based system via elections; when all else fails, Muslims 
necessarily seek its implementation via conflict.
318
 In the course of this paradigm, 
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democracy and freedom are an anathema to Islam and Shari'a,
319
 they are alienable 
concepts perceived as the fruits of Western ideological hegemony that tempt Muslims 
to relinquish their religion and cede their government to secularism, which is a form 
of corrupt man-made system incomparable with divine laws.
320
  
 Through the Shari'a Zones project, the Islamists group
321
 seeks to establish 
safe neighborhoods where vigilante forces implement the rules set forth by their 
interpretation of Islamic law for many reasons. Firstly, they seek to prove to the rest 
of society that Islamic rules maintain safety and prevent unorthodox behavior 
associated with western practices such as gambling, prostitution and consumption of 
alcohol
322
 that bring about moral destruction of society, and cause man to drift away 
from the divine paved roads to heaven.
323
 Secondly, the zones are a tool through 
which Islam can be welcomed and spread around the UK.
324
 In doing so, the group 
believes that the zones will expand the more people welcome and join Islam, and 
would seep into one another to create autonomous Islamic Emirates.
325
 By the same 
logic, these emirates will grow to devour the -then would be- smaller remaining 
areas.
326
 Evidently, Islam will be the leading religion of the country.
327
 That will also 
accomplish the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate system. 
 Essentially, implementing both civil and criminal codes of Shari'a would be a 
step towards realizing the Islamization of the UK. Life within the Shari'a Zones could 
help provide a picture of a society under one such application of Shari'a. To allow the 
surpassing of one religion over all others is not just to grant favor to that particular 
religion, it is also to concede to its dictates regarding the status of other religious 
minorities. Nonetheless, this discussion will entertain the advancements and/or 
repercussions foretold in this scenario, in light of international human rights law; i.e. 
as applied by the state, not the group. However, in this context, the supporters of this 
demand both spoken for and unannounced until the outcome is clearer; have to be 
distinguished from the general Muslim community.  
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Id. By the same derives and implementation, Islam4UK has encouraged the creation of 




 In several declarations by members of the group, non-Muslims were referred 
to as kuffar.
328
 In Arabic, kufr refers to the pitch-blackness of the night, and is used to 
refer to those of no religion; in English, it translates to infidel.
329
 When translated into 
"state attitude", there will be a clear-cut distinction between Muslims and non-
Muslims. What is falsely attributed to Islamic tolerance is in fact, non-Islamic and 
intolerant. At the time of the Prophet -over 1400 years ago- Non-Muslims governed 
by Islamic rule were "allowed relatively tolerable conditions… Jews under the 
Ottoman Turks were often better off than Jews who lived under the European 
Christians… Christians, too, sometimes fled to Islam for religious tolerance."
330
 Then, 
they were referred to as Dhimmis;
331
 they were asked to pay taxes, jizya, in return for 
state protection over life and property.
332
 As such, non-Muslims were allowed to 
practice their religion; enjoy security provided for by the state; and conduct personal 
matters under the auspices of respective private laws, through churches, temples and 
so on.
333
 At the time, Jews were independent from the Shari'a law and sought 
legal/religious aid from Halakha courts.
334
 For all other religious affairs that involved 
restoring churches or building new ones, they had to acquire state approval;
335
 much 
like the aforementioned regulations set forth by English legal system. However, these 
Islamists have referred to non-Muslims as kuffar, equating them with people who 




 Furthermore, through the booklet, UK Muslims are instructed to boycott non-
Muslims as part of their overdue rejection of interfaith: they should not have non-
Muslim friends,
337
 or integrate in a non-Muslim society;
338
 including and not limited 
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to the celebration of Christmas and Easter.
339
 Evidently, any Muslim who have falsely 











 In campaigning for the Shari'a Zones, and, again, their interpretation, of 
Islamic law, members of the group paint a futuristic picture of a purely patriarchal 
society, as drawn by God himself,
344
 where women are mothers and housewives. One 
member's website sought to provide "evidence to prove a woman is for cooking and 
cleaning".
345
 In this picture, women are additionally required to have husband's 
permission to leave the house, refrain from using cosmetics, tabarujj, and have a male 
companion in order to leave the country, mehrem.
346
  
 This scenario represents one perception of the good based on a restrictive 
application derived by jurists such as Sayyid Qutb, Mohammed Al-Nawawi and Gad 
El-Haq. It is a model where features of Western culture are viewed as "satanic 
values", and socially integrated Muslims are to be rehabilitated.
347
 In addition to this 
model's reflection of significant intolerance of the "other", it reflects the non-belief in 
behavioral freedom. The apparent dislike of Western practices has translated into their 
classification into Qutb's jahiliyya so much so that they will be tolerated. As such, Al-
Tahtawi's behavioural freedom, along with cultural rights, will not be strong features, 
if at all, in the application of this scenario.  
 The demand to boycott non-Muslims is a hostile act that drives intolerance to 
inequality, which results in injustice. This inequality, however, will not apply to non-
Muslims alone. After a thorough read of Anjem Choudary's vision of a new 'social 
system', it becomes clear that non-males will be regarded with inferiority as well; i.e. 
women. The description of women's role in this model represents a poor 
understanding of equality, and a strong approval of a social paradigmatic shift 
towards partiarchism.  
 The non-integration with non-Muslims encourages adherents of such 
interpretation to become carriers of discriminatory ideologies that will ultimately, and 
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immediately, develop a strong negative impact on the social rights of non-Muslims. 
Unbeknownst to them, these carriers will initiate the achievement of a mafsad 
("harm"), which is the exact opposite of Shari'a's maqasid:
348
 when state has failed to 
safeguard the individual's faith.  
 This restrictive interpretation presupposes a certain perception of good that 
does not necessarily await Abdel Raziq's notion of agreement of the Muslim 
community, certainly not the inferiorized non-Muslim community. Consequently, the 
ruler, possibly the caliph in this situation will rule as he sees fit. This has to remind of 
Al-Tahtawi's impression of rulers who ruled by whim, the lack of freedom that 
overwhelmed Egypt in the 19
th
 century, versus the justice and equity he witnessed in 
France at the time. Such a development will cause the deterioration of political and 
civil freedoms, the people will not be restricted in their political participation; and 
their rights as citizens will be diminished.  
 Seeing that rulers and caliphs of such states are tools who guide the masses to 
apply the will of God, invested in the Shari'a, and protect them from corrupt man-
made laws, it becomes difficult, almost naïve, to expect this state to adhere by the 
universal provision of international human rights; which are essentially man-made 
laws.  
 This model promotes the imposition of restrictions on individual freedoms and 
the equal enjoyment of rights, along with the stripping of equal standing before the 
law and the subjective optimization of a religion to dominate others. In accordance 
with the amalgamation tailored in the previous chapter, the aforementioned model, if 
materialized, will introduce a new status quo where justice, equality, freedom and 
public interest will become alien principles. 
X. The Compromise  
 Sparked by the intellectual and grounded suggestion of Dr. Rowan Williams in 
the 2008 lecture, the incorporation of the Shari'a civil code is the second scenario to 
be entertained. Although what Williams justified with evidence and a sense of liberal 
realism was widely unaccepted and critiqued by many, it still resonated with others 
who made the effort to emphasize and break down. One such attempt was a 
subsequent lecture by Lord Phillips. This scenario is an entertainment of both 
suggestions and concerns inspired by both lecturers' contribution to the debate on 
English legal tolerance of religious minorities; particularly Islam. While Williams 
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focused his lecture on the role of Shari'a in relation to British law in order to arrive at 
a midway position between being a citizen and a Muslim, Phillips questioned whether 
the law treats everyone equally to conclude that English law is pridefully secular, thus 
it would be difficult for Shari'a to be embraced further.  
 Dr. Williams started his lecture addressing the concerns and growing fears 
evoked by the challenges of the dominance of Shari'a.
349
 He explained how the 
universal principles of Shari'a are actualized, as understood by intellectuals and 
Islamic theologians, and not ready-made.
350
 What is actualized for him and others is 
that these principles are non-negotiable and that they assume the "voluntary consent 
or submission of the believer."
351
 In arguing for that conviction, Williams exclaimed 
the possibility of ijtihad, as opposed to the collation of traditional judgments.
352
 
However, the actualizations do differ from one school to the other. The imposition of 
Shari'a' on everyone and the persistence on the lack of harmony between Islamic law 
and IHRL is the understanding of some. Evidently, many Arab countries promote the 
belonging to a Muslim community along with belonging to political community; 
Williams himself spoke of Jordan and Morocco, and even the Pakistani state under 
Jinnah as evidence that memberships in both are not necessarily coterminous.
353
   
 The call for the domination of Islam touches upon the debate regarding 
secularism v. religious rule. If both concepts are not coterminous, then it begs the 
ultimatum of choice. Where a conceptualization based on citizenship entails political 
hegemony, an Islamic-based one designates the divine covenant to be stand-alone.
354
 
Based on the previous scenario, the latter choice is inapplicable for its infringements 
on entitlements; which are all provoked according to the actualization of some. Thus, 
Williams explained the importance to finding a "just and constructive relationship 
between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United Kingdom," especially for the 
sake of the common good.
355
 While the former choice may seem more appealing to 
religious minorities and other ethnic groups, it is vital to bear in mind that the laws 
instigated by this system will reflect the predisposition of legislators; whether they are 
tolerant, welcoming to diversity or discriminatory by nature.
356
  
 In compromise of the two mutually exclusive monopolies, Williams touched 
upon the legitimization of Islamic principles; such as family law, matrimonial affairs 
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 He also promoted transformative accommodation, which 
allows an individual to choose his or her own means of jurisdiction and mediation as 
well.
358
 This accommodation, he justified, combats social alienation such as ghettoism 
that might cause the disenfranchising of minorities.
359
  
 While plausible suggestions, Lord Phillips found implications that beg 
reconsideration, both on the grounds of sufficient existing toleration, and legal 
enforceability. Overall, there are 30 parliamentary acts addressing discrimination 
alone in English law.
360
 Evidently, Muslims are recognized by religion, rather than 
race.
361
 The regulations concerning payment of mortgages have been modified twice 
so as not to offend Islamic principles; which regards to paying ribba ("interest").
362
 
Shari'a courts are allowed to mediate conflicts as a peaceful mean of settling 
disputes.
363
 Therefore, Lord Phillips believes that the UK government has already 
gone a long way to embrace its Muslim community and tailor to its needs.
364
  
 On the legal side, Phillips points out implications regarding the failure to 
comply with suggested adjustments to English law. When judges dismiss the religious 
workings on society in the course of cases with a religious element, not only do they 
affect -in their rulings- the citizen's entitlements of rights, but also, fail to reinforce 
the position envisioned by the lawmakers.
365
 The injunction of Islamic law can be 
refuted on the merits that complying with some of its implications would create a 
divide between rights for citizens and rights for Muslims. Phillips provides the 





; depending on the definition and the applied school of thought. As such, 
penalties provided for in Shari'a cannot be enacted through English courts, and the 
sanctions befalling the failure to comply should rest within the hands of independent 
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judges. One simple answer would be to designate the governing laws of any contracts 
upon their establishment.
368
 At the core of it, Phillips refutes the application of the 
rules of one religion over others seeing that the law already safeguards tolerance and 
mutual respect among different people.
369
  
 In essence, to arrive at a just and constructive relationship between both legal 
systems, it serves to consider providing judges with appropriate legal tools in order to 
decide on cases with a religious element. The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction is 
one method to be considered in trying to reach a compromise for the demand of 
Shari'a incorporation. If instigated by the state, this doctrine would allow for the 
temporary extension of one court's jurisdiction over all other matters and claims 
related to the case before it.
370
 In this scenario, it plays to extend an English court's 
jurisdiction to Shari'a courts so as to have a bigger picture of a dispute before it. 
Moreover, religious know-how would be accessible to lawyers and judges. Instigating 
this doctrine would apply to all religious courts, hence, no scales would be tipped in 
favor of one minority over another.  
XI. The Multicultural Fix 
 The current status quo in UK presents significant resistance to the demand. 
Muslims compromise only 4.7% of the population,
371
 a significant mainstream of 
which appreciate the multifaith and multicultural nature of the British society, and do 
not support the Islamist call for Islamic dominion. Additionally, the interpretation 
offered by Islamists, as touched upon in the first scenario, has provoked numerous 
human rights activists to counter-demand the government, and rally the people, not 
subdue to such fundamentalist assertions.  
 Through reflections by representatives of the Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB)
372
, both emphasized the minute percentage of the Islamists behind such a 
demand.
373
 With a 1.6 Million Muslim residing in the UK,
374
 some concentrations are 
said to behave as Shari'a Zones, one example would be the Tower Hamlets area with a 
                                                 
368






 Interviews, Supra note 316.  
372
 The Muslim Council of Britain (MSB) is a national representative Muslim umbrella body with over 
500 affiliated national, regional and local organizations, mosques, charities and schools. 
373
 Interviews, Supra note 316. 
374








 According to Helbawi, who assumed that all these 
residents approve of the Zones' project, they would compromise an insignificant 
0.12% of the total population.
376
 While both acknowledge individual rights and 




 While the board of the MCB did refrained from responding to the rallies and 
protests by members of the Islamist group, other Muslims took up a more pro-active 
response and counter-rallied. In response to Islam4UK, a group of Muslim youth 
sought to campaign against the imposition of a one interpretation of Shari'a, and also 
to promote UK multiculturalism. Mr. Inayat Bunglawala, founder of Muslims4UK, 
contributed a long list of writings to promote social cohesion and condemn the 
fundamentalist hands attempting to dissolve it. Furthermore, Muslims4UK have 




 Of the most active humanitarian groups is the One Law for All campaign. 
Comprised of mostly feminist activists, the campaign contributes in whichever way 
they can to raise awareness on the human rights hazards and violations if Shari'a law 
was ever implemented.
379
 Spokesperson Ann-Marie Waters described:  
"Our campaign is against the use of religious laws in family or 
criminal matters - we believe these areas fundamentally affect 
people's basic human rights and therefore should be conducted under 
a single, secular and democratically mandated legal system. This legal 
system should apply to all people - no distinctions or exceptions for 
religion or culture. If Muslims are to live their private lives in 
accordance with Shari'a, that is their right. However, as soon as they 
begin to impose Shari'a onto another person, it ceases to be a private 
matter and becomes a matter for public law.
380
  
 With this significant counter movement, the current status quo seems 
approved of and promoted, not just by the Muslim community in the UK, but also by 
many factions and ideological organizations as well. On this side of the debate, the 
UK is perceived as a "world-leader in democracy and human rights… a citizen has a 
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right to live their lives in accordance with their religion. They do not have a right to 
demand that a state impose that religion - or a specific interpretation of that religion - 
onto others."
381
 There seems to be strong appreciation of the diversity, justice, 
equality and freedom safeguarded and promoted by the state.  
XII. An Assertion 
 Britain's first Muslim counter-extremism think-tank was co-founded by Ed 
Husain; a former Islamic fundamentalist who came to reject extremism after five 
years of being an operative and a recruiter.
382
 In a book titled, The Islamist, Husain 
narrated his own journey from a theatre-loving boy to an Islamic fundamentalist, then 
to a rejecter of such fundamentalism.
383
 The turning point at which Husain 
consciously rejected the beliefsystem of five years, his observations and personal 
reflections will serve to help have a better understanding the psyche of the people 
promoting this demand. More so, they will help assert their misguided aim and their 
non-relevance to the true higher objectives of Islam. 
 Ed Husain was an active operative; he was recruited by the Young Muslim 
Organization, then moved to Hizb ut-Tahrir ("liberation party").
384
 The moment 
Husain's strong belief in Islamic fundamentalism shook to its core was when an 
innocent's life was wasted: a Christian boy, a colleague of Husain's, lost his life at the 
hands of Islamists youths after a row over pool tables.
385
 The realization of the 
atmosphere he had helped create, where the value of life of a non-Muslim had become 
"of little consequence in attaining Muslim dominance."
386
 Husain believed the murder 
was "the direct result of Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideas."
387
 Moreover, Husain blamed Omar 
Bakri Muahmmad for the poisonous hizb atmosphere created.
388
 The insignificant 
value of life reflected in this story was only supported by Husain's description of a 
discussion with a college professor who compared the Nazi ideology of a superior 
race with that of Islamic fundamentalism.
389
 At which point, Husain confessed in his 
book how Islamic fundamentalists (minimally, the ones he encountered) did not look 
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back the holocaust as an atrocity.
390
 This notable sense of intellectual superiority, 
Husain described, was rooted in the message propagated by such Islamists: true 
Muslims are superior to all others faiths; including and not limited to partial Muslism 
(defined as ones accepting to abide by man-made laws and integrating with the non-
Muslim society).
391
  In the teachings of those fundamentalists, Husain quoted, parents 
who did not believe in the goal of the organization were obstacles in achieving 'God's 
work'; with which ties should be severed.
392
 
 In that context, non-Muslims are referred to as kuffar against which hatred was 
repeatedly incited. Husain reported being trained to connect local issues with global 
issues to promulgate a universal hatred towards Muslims and necessitate their unity 
and struggle against the hostile non-Muslim societies in the world: 
"They slaughter us in Bosnia, expel us from our homes in Palestine, 
and refuse us the basic right to pray in Britain." I would say to 
students in the corridors. Again, just as the hizb had trained usÖ 
management [at college] was increasingly perceived as anti-Muslim 
and racist. At the same time we opened a second front to our 
confrontation, this time with Sikhs and Hindus.
393
  
On the inside, Husain shared two very notable observations. The first being the 
hypocrisy on segregation of the sexes: where a constitutional draft (prepared by a 
hizb) leader strictly forbade the mixing of the sexes in any context.
394
 Whereas, he 
reported the non-issue of this prescription in then-current hizb meetings; to the extent 




 The other, and final, observation Husain made was his comparison between 
his identification to God, with Faye's (his love interest).391 Coming from the same 
social, cultural and education background as his family's, Faye was also a devout 
Muslim, untainted by 'Islamic' associations.
396
 Towards the end of his fifth year, 
Husain noted the difference in their perception of God: Faye's God was "close, loving, 
caring, facilitating, forgiving and merciful."
397
 Whereas Husain's God was "full of 
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 Such enlightening experience included significant details that prelude to the 
mental and intellectual birth of an Islamic fundamentalist. The psyche of whom 
perceives Islam as a religion with no justice or equality, with no relevance to the value 
of life, with rationalized severance of lineage ties, with no space for freedom; all 
through a more rationalized sense of superiority and authority to others. All of which 
effectively falls short of the true understanding of Islam and of human rights. 
 Husain's experience is highlighted to serve as the concluding remarks to be put 
forth. Had the group promulgated a perception of 'good' that entailed more justice, 
tolerance, equality or mercy, their project would have been truly of Islamic nature. 
The problem lies in their misguided use of what is an essentially spiritual relationship, 
as a tool for political domination. This research had illustrated to different perceptions 
of Islam, one that adheres to justice and equality of all, and another employed to fill 
intellects and hearts with an artificial of superiority. A person who seeks to pollute 
others' perceptions with hatred, anger and presumed suffering, is not a Muslim; but a 
con artist.  
 At the core, the preliminary demand is far from viable. The last scenario, 
presumably, would be called for by entirely secularist counter movements such as 
One Law for All; understandably driven by concern over the repercussions of allowing 
such a rigid interpretation of Shari'a to apply -with particular emphasis to women and 
children. Of the three scenarios, the incorporation of both civil and criminal branches 
of Shari'a stands as highly unlikely seeing the small momentum behind the project. 
The examination of the British system, in terms of both law and society, has 
highlighted the progression towards the Compromise; i.e. the adoption the civil 
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